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3 1 The Emergence and Perpetuation of a Destructive Culture in an Elite 
5 
6 2 Sport in the United Kingdom 
7 
8 3 Recent inquiries into elite sports in the United Kingdom has unearthed examples 
10 4 of destructive cultures. Yet, earlier research left destructive cultures overlooked. 
11 
12 5 The purpose of this article is to (1) outline the process of how a destructive 
13 6 organisational culture emerges and perpetuates in one Olympic sport in the 
14 
15 7 United Kingdom, and (2) the features that regulate the process. We combined 
16 8 Action Research and Grounded Theory in a 16-month longitudinal study. The 
18 9 primary data collection strategies were ethnography and ten focus groups, with 
19 10 athletes, coaches, parents, and the national governing body (NGB). Twenty-six 
21 11 individual interviews with stakeholders supplemented these. A destructive culture 
22 
23 12 emerged during radical changes, and antagonism in the power relations between 
24 13 the NGB and stakeholders characterised this process. Denial of responsibility and 
25 
26 14 social weighting neutralised the stigma of perpetuating antagonism. In 
27 15 conclusion, sports organisations should be vigilant of how ignoring and denying 
29 16 antagonism could lead to a destructive culture. 
30 
31 
32 17 Keywords: culture; destructive conflict; elite sports; organisational psychology; 
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3 20 The Emergence and Perpetuation of a Destructive Culture in an Elite Sport in the 
4 
5 21 United Kingdom 
7 
8 22 Organisational culture used to be an avenue for researching covert power relations and 
9 
10 23 backstage politics. It also used to provide thick analyses of organisational life (Alvesson 
11 
12 24 2017). It is a field that is very much alive in contemporary research. Yet, it is also a very 
14 
15 25 divisive field of inquiry (Mcdougall et al. 2017; Alvesson 2017). In academia, it serves 
16 
17 26 as a vehicle for interest in the symbolic dimensions of organisational life and processes 
18 
19 27 of meaning-making. And for practitioners, culture serves as a toolkit for creating 
20 
21 
22 28 commitment and transforming underperforming or destructive cultures (Cruickshank 
23 
24 29 and Collins 2012). 
25 
26 30 The normative approach to understanding organisational culture in sports has 
27 
28 31 been to conceptualise it through a performance enhancement lens (cf. Maitland, Hills, 
30 
31 32 and Rhind 2015; Cruickshank, Collins, and Minten 2014, 2015). It has been identified 
32 
33 33 as having a significant influence on talent development (see Henriksen and Stambulova 
34 
35 34 2017; Henriksen, Stambulova, and Roessler 2010a, 2011, 2010b), developing a high- 
37 
38 35 performance culture (see Henriksen 2015), performance outcomes at the Olympic 
39 
40 36 Games (see Gould et al. 2002; Greenleaf, Gould, and Dieffenbach 2001), and 
41 
42 37 performance leadership (see Fletcher and Arnold 2011). 
43 
44 
45 38 A recent review by Wagstaff and Burton-Wylie (2018) observe that upwards of 
46 
47 39 seventy per cent of sport research studies culture through an integration lens. Using the 
48 
49 40 integration paradigm centres on the functionality of a culture (cf. Fletcher and Arnold 
50 
51 41 2011; Henriksen 2015; Cruickshank, Collins, and Minten 2013). Culture is thus an 
53 
54 42 integration mechanism that teaches new members an agreed upon set of appropriate 
55 
56 43 behaviours (Schein 2010). Success or a high-performing culture is, therefore, 
57 
58 44 characterised by a unified and robust culture (Henriksen 2015). Schein (2010) details 
60 
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3 45 that this paradigm assumes that a leader’s values are a master blueprint for an 
4 
5 46 organisation’s culture. In doing so, it delivers culture as a variable that can be 
7 
8 47 manipulated at the discretion of a charismatic leader. 
9 
10 48 Nevertheless, recent management research (e.g. Alvesson 2017; Helin et al. 
11 
12 49 2014) has criticised this line of inquiry. This frustration is because only focusing on 
14 
15 50 what is shared tends to exacerbate much of the profound cultural understanding. 
16 
17 51 Alvesson (2017) highlights that organisational practitioners are often let down by the 
18 
19 52 inadequacies of this superficial understanding. Reducing culture to a consensus-based 
20 
21 
22 53 system (see Wagstaff and Burton-Wylie 2018) does tend to deny ambiguity and 
23 
24 54 inconsistencies (Mannion and Davies 2016). This superficial line of inquiry has even 
25 
26 55 led some researchers to comment on organisational culture as a field which is 
27 
28 56 ‘intellectually dead’ (see Alvesson 2017; Wagstaff and Burton-Wylie 2018). 
30 
31 57 We propose to dive underneath the surface of organisational culture (see 
32 
33 58 Alvesson 2017; Helin et al. 2014) and consider the backstage processes. In denying 
34 
35 59 ambiguity, research in sport has tended to overlook the harmful characteristics of 
37 
38 60 organisational cultures. One reason might be that the integration perspective only 
39 
40 61 considers shared aspects (Maitland, Hills, and Rhind 2015). Yet, athletes are often 
41 
42 
62 commodified in win-at-all-costs cultures (Mountjoy 2018). Current research has 
44 
45 63 considered organisational culture as a source of strain for athletes (Arnold, Fletcher, and 
46 
47 64 Daniels 2013); underpinning unsuccessful talent development environments (Henriksen, 
48 
49 
50 65 Larsen, and Christensen 2014); and cultures that deny, ignore, and accept abuse 
51 
52 66 (Mountjoy 2018). This latter consideration came in the wake of the Nassar abuse 
53 
54 67 scandal (Daniels 2017). Other global examples of destructive cultures include a culture 
55 
56 68 of not counting the [human] costs in Australian cricket (The Ethics Centre 2018), and 
58 
59 69 allegations of a culture of bullying in the United Kingdom (Grey-Thompson 2017). 
60 
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3 70 Some might dismiss these as extreme cases. Yet, the Culture Health Check carried out 
4 
5 71 by UK Sport (2018) stated that there is a ‘need to address unacceptable behaviour in the 
7 
8 72 High Performance System’ (p. 14). These applied concerns shed light on the 
9 
10 73 controversy of how athletes and those who work in sports are treated (Grey-Thompson 
11 
12 74 2017). 
14 
15 75 Many wishes these phenomena did not exist. Yet, the sports sector is under more 
16 
17 76 scrutiny than ever before. Earlier research has neglected destructive cultures by denying 
18 
19 77 ambiguity. But, authors have also highlighted a common thread referring to the 
20 
21 
22 78 organisational culture of the organisations involved and the potential institutional 
23 
24 79 culpability (see McCradden and Cusimano 2018; Grey-Thompson 2017; Daniels 2017). 
25 
26 80 It is, therefore, prompt to consider the less desirable aspects of organisational culture. 
27 
28 
29 81 Especially those cultures that have destructive features to them (Grey-Thompson 2017; 
30 




35 83 Researching Destructive Organisational Culture Processes 
36 
37 84 This article is a part of a more extensive longitudinal study into a change of culture in 
39 
40 85 one sport in the United Kingdom. Building on Alvesson (2017), we seek to illuminate 
41 
42 86 cultural processes as-they-happen. Building on Mannion and Davies (2016) we define 
43 
44 87 culture as a dynamic process of negotiating values and beliefs that, for a time, provides 
45 
46 
88 problems and solutions to a defined group. This definition frames this study by taking 
48 
49 89 the position that organisations are cultures. Doing so treats organisational culture as a 
50 
51 90 metaphor of organisation. Meyerson and Martin (1987) explains that this view 
52 
53 91 emphasises inconsistencies and disagreements rather than consensus. Moreover, this 
55 
56 92 position stresses ‘the importance of various subunits including groups and individuals’ 
57 
58 93 (Meyerson and Martin 1987, 630). An organisation is simply an arbitrary boundary 
59 
60 
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3 94 around a collection of subcultures. The unique features of organisational culture are, 
4 
5 95 therefore, how subcultures meet in negotiating values and beliefs (Meyerson and Martin 
7 
8 96 1987). Moreover, how this process can influence diversity, ambiguity, and conflict in 
9 
10 97 progressive and/or destructive ways. 
11 
12 98 Subcultures are groups within an organisational culture. These can have 
14 
15 99 overlapping, at variance, or ambivalent features with those of the broader culture 
16 
17 100 (Mannion and Davies 2016). Accordingly, subcultures might represent orthogonal 
18 
19 101 subcultures that tacitly accepts another subculture (Mannion and Davies 2016). 
20 
21 
22 102 Subcultures might be counter subcultures representing disagreements leading to conflict 
23 
24 103 or antagonism. Alternatively, enhancing subcultures. These might appear as a response 
25 
26 104 to changes that are more fervent to their dynamic process of negotiating culture. Thus 
27 
28 105 amplifying and supporting other subcultures (Mannion and Davies 2016). 
30 
31 106 The unique contribution of this article is that we illuminate the cultural process 
32 
33 107 of the emergence and perpetuation of a destructive culture. Researching destructive 
34 
35 108 cultures is a chasm in academic research. So, we need a lens through which we can start 
37 
38 109 to understand what constitutes a destructive culture. We propose that legitimacy may be 
39 
40 110 a favourable lens. Pfarrer, DeCelles, Smith, and Taylor (2008) suggest that legitimacy is 
41 
42 111 a general perception of an individual’s or organisation’s actions as appropriate within a 
43 
44 
45 112 socially constructed system. Since organisations can have different perceptions of what 
46 
47 113 is socially desirable behaviours based on their characteristics, legitimacy originates in a 
48 
49 114 relationship between broader societal norms and the culture in the organisation (cf. 
50 
51 115 Pfarrer et al. 2008). A destructive culture violates legitimacy through enacting 
53 
54 116 behaviours violating broader societal norms and standards of conduct (Pfarrer et al. 
55 
56 117 2008). Examples are a culture enacting behaviours such as fear, intimidation, and 
57 
58 118 bullying (Phelps et al. 2017; King 2012) and a culture where athletes are commodified; 
60 
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3 119 power relationships are abused; and this abuse is denied, ignored, and even the norm 
4 
5 120 (Mountjoy 2018; McCradden and Cusimano 2018). Also, Grey-Thompson (2017) 
7 
8 121 illustrates the relationship between broader social norms and culture by explaining: 
9 
10 122 ‘[s]port cannot think of itself as special or different and able to behave outside what are 
11 
12 123 considered acceptable behaviour patterns’ (p. 4). Researching destructive cultures 
14 
15 124 against this backdrop is a critical addition to the literature. The purpose of this article is 
16 
17 125 to (1) outline the process of how a destructive organisational culture emerges and 
18 
19 126 perpetuates in one Olympic sport in the United Kingdom, and (2) the features that 
20 
21 
22 127 regulate the process. 
23 
24 
25 128 Methodology 
27 
28 129 This study adopts an approach integrating Action Research (AR) and Grounded Theory 
29 
30 130 Methodology (GT) (Dick 2007; Teram, Schachter, and Stalker 2005). AR focuses on 
31 
32 
131 change and collaboration with participants on finding solutions to unwanted conditions 
34 
35 132 (see Gergen 2015). And GT focuses on unravelling process-as-it-happens (see Corbin 
36 
37 133 and Strauss 2015). Integrating these allows us to understand the participative reality of 
38 
39 134 change processes (Dick 2007; Heron and Reason 2006). Henceforth, we will adopt the 
41 
42 135 term Grounded Action to describe this integrated method. We continue by outlining the 
43 
44 136 data collection strategies before showing the entanglements of the on-going iterative 
45 
46 137 analysis and rigour. The rigour of this study is underpinned by the epistemology of the 
48 
49 138 Participatory Inquiry Paradigm (see Heron and Reason 1997). This paradigm sets the 
50 
51 139 tone for how we engaged participants in the research. Besides how the iterative analysis 
52 
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3 141 Data Collection Strategies 
4 
5 
6 142 In adopting a participatory approach, we chose ethnographic observations as the 
7 
8 143 primary data collection approach and focus group interviews as the secondary strategy. 
9 
10 144 We did so to bring collaboration and dialogue to the forefront of the study (Heron and 
12 
13 145 Reason 2006). We supplemented these two approaches with semi-structured interviews 
14 




19 147 Ethnographic observations. 
20 
21 148 The first author was embedded in a National Governing Body (NGB) as a critical friend 
22 
23 
24 149 (e.g. providing a mirror, asking provocative questions, and providing helpful critiques) 
25 
26 150 for sixteen months. This role included extensive fieldwork to illuminate events as they 
27 
28 151 unfolded (Krane and Baird 2005; Costa and Kallick 1993). These events happened at 
29 
30 152 the department, inter-department, and organisational meetings at the offices of the NGB, 
32 
33 153 Youth National Team camps, Coach Development courses, competitions, public events, 
34 
35 154 and staff outings. Extensive field notes were expressed in memos and diagrams, which 
36 
37 155 is in line with core GT elements (see Holt 2016). 
39 
40 
41 156 Focus group interviews. 
42 
43 
44 157 The first-author carried out ten focus groups lasting from 40 – 130 minutes (Table 1). 
45 
46 158 These aimed at engaging participants in dialogue to explore the different narratives and 
47 
48 159 being sensitive to the interpersonal communication to highlight subcultural 
50 
51 160 understandings (Kitzinger 1995). The first focus group was with the Talent Team (see 
52 
53 161 Reconnaissance). This discussion aimed at identifying essential stakeholders and critical 
54 
55 162 areas of inquiry (e.g. what do I need to know to understand your sport? What is the 
56 
57 
163 history of your sport?). Doing so grouped other participants (Parents of Athletes, 
59 
60 
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3 164 Coaches, Athletes aged 18-23; Table 1) to identify key areas for the ethnography (e.g. 
4 
5 165 what should I notice about your sport?). 
7 
8 
9 166 Semi-structured interviews. 
10 
11 
12 167 This study also included twenty-six semi-structured individual interviews (35-75 min; 
13 
14 168 Brinkmann and Kvale 2018). These probed perceptions of the elite sports context, the 
15 
16 169 emergence of antagonism, and how inside and outside factors influenced the process. 
18 
19 170 The Talent Team and the first-author developed the interview guides from field notes, 
20 
21 171 open coding, and data from the focus groups (Brinkmann and Kvale 2018). We 
22 
23 172 identified participants via theoretical sampling (see procedure). 
25 
26 
27 173 Documents. 
28 
29 
30 174 We collected documents and web pages to garner contextual depth of the NGB and the 
31 
32 175 community of the sport. Documents included training programmes, official papers 
33 




38 177 Procedure, Analysis, and Rigor 
39 
40 
41 178 Five NGBs were contacted via email in May 2017 after obtaining ethical approval. The 
42 
43 179 first-author held phone meetings with three respondents. We agreed with one NGB to 
44 
45 180 take part. So, the present study was carried out from July 2017 – November 2018. In 
46 
47 
181 understanding organisations as cultures (see Meyerson and Martin 1987), we define the 
49 
50 182 organisational culture under study as an organisation consisting of an NGB of a multi- 
51 
52 183 event sport, and the community within the sport. This sport is a longstanding part of the 
53 
54 184 Summer Olympic Games. The organisation was also comprised of approximately 15000 
56 
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3 186 individuals are anonymous. Yet, we strive to provide a vivid description of the context 
4 
5 187 in the findings section. 
7 
8 188 Meyerson and Martin (1987) also emphasise the salience of influences from 
9 
10 189 outside the organisation. We will therefore also consider the governance relevant to 
11 
12 190 talent development in the UK. This context includes a plurality of support agencies (see 
14 
15 191 Grix and Phillpots 2011). Including the English Institute of Sport (EIS) that provides 
16 
17 192 sport science and medical support services; the Talented Athlete Scholarship Scheme 
18 
19 193 (TASS), which is a partnership between talented athletes, education institutions, and 
20 
21 
22 194 NGBs supporting dual-career athletes; and UK Coaching, which supports coach 
23 
24 195 development. Rather than having a dispersed funding system through a plurality of 
25 
26 196 agencies, it is concentrated around two organisations, Sport England and UK Sport (cf. 
27 
28 197 Houlihan & Green, 2009). Grix and Phillpots (2011) explain that the influence of this is 
30 
31 198 that: ‘most National Governing Bodies of sport (NGBs) are hidebound to their 
32 




37 200 Grounded Action Cycles 
38 
39 
201 Figure 1 summarises the participatory Grounded Action process. The procedure 
41 
42 202 included a reconnaissance phase and four double-cycles of an implementation and 
43 
44 203 monitoring phase, and a reflection and review phase. 
46 




51 205 Reconnaissance 
52 
53 206 The reconnaissance lasted from July 2017 – November 2017. It aimed to establish an 
54 
55 
56 207 understanding of the context with the view to identify later collaboration (Gilbourne & 
57 
58 208 Richardson, 2005). The first step was to negotiate consent for the longitudinal study 
59 
60 209 (Iphofen 2013). Following this, we established a research group to integrate a group of 
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3 210 participants as co-researchers throughout the study (Kildedal and Laursen 2014). We 
4 
5 211 label this group the Talent Team. It consisted of the Talent Manager, the Head of Coach 
7 
8 212 Development, the Talent Administrator, and the first author. During this process, we 
9 
10 213 agreed that the first-author should act as a critical friend in the Talent Team to provide a 
11 
12 214 mirror (Costa and Kallick 1993; Duus et al. 2014). The Assistant Talent Manager and 
14 
15 215 the Head Talent Coach were recruited into the group in September 2017. This group 
16 
17 216 oversaw talent development and the senior elite programme. Our ambition was to move 
18 
19 217 participants from being passive vessels to engage them into dialogue on what was 
20 
21 
22 218 meaningful in their context (Sbaraini et al. 2011). 
23 
24 219 The first author began open coding as soon as the first data was collected. This 
25 
26 220 process focused on describing the preconditions and agreeing on a meaningful future 
27 
28 221 state (Holt 2016). Memo-writing as well as introducing the conditional/consequential 
30 
31 222 matrix and the paradigm aided the process (Kelle 2007; Corbin and Strauss 2015). All 
32 
33 223 concepts were discussed in the Talent Team. We identified anomalies during this 
34 
35 224 collaborative process. Anomalies included athletes in underserved areas (Theoretical 
37 
38 225 sampling 1) and how external stakeholders influenced the outside conditions. These 
39 
40 226 stakeholders included other NGBs, and the following Governing Sports Organisations 
41 
42 227 (GSO): UK Sport, Sport England, UK Coaching, EIS, TASS, and a University Sports 
43 
44 
45 228 Programme (Theoretical sampling 2; Table 1). Each participant in Theoretical sampling 
46 
47 229 2 took part in two individual Skype interviews. We allowed for at least two months 
48 
49 230 between the first and second interview to increase the contextual depth and help to 
50 
51 231 explore the fluid nuances of culture change (Culver 2012; Maitland, Hills, and Rhind 
53 
54 232 2015). Using Skype eased geographical constraints and the hectic schedules of upper- 
55 
56 233 echelon employees (Deakin and Wakefield 2014; Janghorban, Roudsari, and Taghipour 
57 
58 234 2014; Table 1). 
60 
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3 235 The Talent Team and Management (i.e. upper-echelon staff) formulated a goal 
4 
5 236 of a change of culture in the sport. This change was understood as a transformation of 
7 




12 238 Implementation and Monitoring Phase 
13 
14 239 The implementation and monitoring phase shifted the focus from describing the 
15 
16 240 prevailing context to describing the culture processes. The iterative process held this 
18 
19 241 critical shift together. And the Talent Team engaged in constant comparison (see Weed 
20 
21 242 2017) of new data and concepts to the understanding of the preconditions. Doing so 
22 
23 243 helped expand and create analytical diversity (Smith and McGannon 2018). The 
25 
26 244 practical approach was to discuss the data and analysis at monthly meetings. Constant 
27 
28 245 comparison was also used to check that all insights were grounded in all parts of the 
29 
30 246 analysis (Weed 2017). The shift helped analyse how a destructive culture emerged by 
31 
32 
247 probing under the surface of organisational life (Alvesson 2017). 
34 
35 
36 248 Reflection and Review Phase 
38 
39 249 The last phase of the cycle entailed reflecting on and reviewing the emerging concepts. 
40 
41 250 Here, we assessed the structural, process, and contextual fit (Mannion and Davies 
42 
43 251 2016). Engaging the researcher and the Talent Team in thinking theoretically helped 
45 
46 252 open unique cultural nuances and insights. Both in the patterns of the process as well as 
47 
48 253 between and within each phase of the study (Holt 2016). The iterative analysis showed 
49 
50 254 that counter subcultures were crucial. Thus, we invited three individuals to take part in 
52 
53 255 individual interviews to probe the findings from the fieldwork. One agreed to take part 
54 
55 256 given the sensitive nature of engaging in disagreements and antagonism (Theoretical 
56 
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3 258 Terminating the research enterprise. 
4 
5 
6 259 Interrogating for theoretical saturation was a critical task for the Talent Team. It 
7 
8 260 happened as a collaborative judgment on the clear relationships between the concepts 
9 
10 261 and categories from the analysis. Moreover, whether collecting new data would be 
12 
13 262 counterproductive (Holt 2016). We carried out two meetings with parents of athletes in 
14 
15 263 September 2018; three individual interviews in September, October, and November 
16 
17 264 2018; and one Focus Group with the Talent Team in November 2018 as a part of this 
18 
19 
265 process (Table 1). The last step was one meeting with three participants from 
21 
22 266 Theoretical Sampling 2 (i.e. two Talent Leads and one GSO representative) in 
23 
24 267 November 2018. Doing so aimed to engage more participants in the interrogation and 
25 
26 268 assess the fit and relevance of the findings. The first author’s direct engagement with 
28 






35 271 We propose a framework (see Figure 2) which outlines the Process of the Emergence 
36 
37 272 and Perpetuation of a Destructive Culture. Preconditions and Ongoing structural 
39 
40 273 conditions underpinned the dynamic process. Figure 2 shows the process of changing 
41 
42 274 stages of culture. These stages included a Challenge to survival and Emergence of a 
43 
44 275 destructive culture. Finally, our analysis suggested an Organisational outcome: 
45 
46 
47 276 Perpetuation of a destructive culture. The overlapping circles denote the core concept 
48 
49 277 of ongoing power relations and subprocesses of legitimising and rationalising the stigma 
50 
51 278 of destructive behaviours. Power relations denote an interdependent capacity saturating 
52 
53 279 the relationships between organisations (e.g. GSOs), subcultures, and individuals. It 
55 
56 280 includes Systemic power and Informational power, which we will introduce in the 
57 
58 281 sections below. 
59 
60 
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3 282 Entanglement of Preconditions and Ongoing Structural Conditions 
4 
5 
6 283 The prevailing conditions were an entanglement of Preconditions and the Ongoing 
7 
8 284 Inside and Outside Structural Conditions. The iterative nature of the analysis enabled 
9 
10 285 this finding since this approach was a new tool for understanding the alternative logic of 
12 
13 286 the processual enactment of culture. 
14 
15 
16 287 Preconditions 
18 
19 288 We found that the sport was loosely coupled to the external context. This was the case 
20 
21 289 since most subcultures in the sport argued that their sport was ‘special’ and ‘not like 
22 
23 
24 290 other sports’ (see Figure 2). Most participants also explained how they perceived 
25 
26 291 GSOs—particularly Sport England and UK Sport—as the source of earlier hardships. 
27 
28 292 Recent funding changes (December 2016) had necessitated retrenchment to core 
29 
30 293 services (i.e. membership, coach education, safeguarding, and competitions). 
32 
33 294 The NGB had reduced staff as they took immediate actions to ensure short-term 
34 
35 295 survival and financial stability. Reducing the scope also required a restructuring of the 
36 
37 296 talent and senior elite performance programmes. These went from full-time professional 
39 
40 297 to volunteer-based services. This occurred with no NGB oversight. Instead, non-NGB 
41 
42 298 individuals set up unofficial talent and senior elite initiatives. 
43 
44 299 The NGB hired new staff (i.e. the Talent Team) after receiving ring-fenced 
45 
46 
47 300 funding for talent development from Sport England in April 2017. The funding was 
48 
49 301 awarded on a two-year basis with the possibility of a two-year extension in April 2019 
50 
51 302 provided the NGB met certain targets. Yet, the new staff’s lack of specialised 
52 
53 
54 303 knowledge of the sport delegitimised their systemic power with subcultures. In 
55 
56 304 general, the preconditions described how the changes increased uncertainty and a 
57 
58 
59 305 fragile symbiosis between subcultures. 
60 
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3 306 Ongoing structural conditions 
4 
5 
6 307 The ongoing outside structural conditions included recent global events (e.g. bullying 
7 
8 308 allegations and destructive culture) in sports. These events influenced the political will 
9 
10 309 towards letting sports carry on without oversight. Loose coupling between this sport and 
12 
13 310 outside structural conditions worked as a buffer. The primary coupling was through 
14 
15 311 formal funding relationships with Sport England and UK Sport. However, the 
16 
17 312 perception of these organisations as the root of many previous problems devalued their 
18 
19 
313 systemic power with the community. Buffering limited the influence of changing 
21 
22 314 societal norms, values, and beliefs; economic and social resources; and the evolving 
23 
24 315 dependency between GSOs and NGBs (see Figure 2). 
25 
26 316 The inside structural conditions were an evolving process anchored in the 
28 
29 317 history of the sport. This history included antagonism from athletes, coaches, and 
30 
31 318 subcultures. This antagonism had previously led to legal cases contesting decisions 
32 
33 319 made by the NGB and to athletes changing nationality. It had also led to the failings of 
35 
36 320 two former short-lived (sixteen months and fourteen months) talent programmes. Many 
37 
38 321 stakeholders also criticised the previous performance programmes for favouritism, 
39 
40 322 nepotism, and superimposing incompatible working practices on this sport (e.g. 
41 
42 
323 perceived Eastern European authoritarianism). 
44 
45 
46 324 Stages of a Destructive Culture 
48 
49 325 The Preconditions and Ongoing structural conditions influenced the stages of an 
50 




55 327 A challenge to Survival or Social Position 
56 
57 
328 Systemic power relations influenced this stage. First, Sport England engaged in 
59 
60 329 employing their formal authority through imposing targets and deliverables. Here, 
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3 330 described by a Talent Team member: 
4 
5 331 I just came from a meeting with Sport England. We have all these 
7 
8 332 targets that we basically have to live up to. But I don’t know if they are 
9 
10 333 fit for the new programme because we basically just inherited them 
11 
12 334 from the old one. So, I am trying to change them. But it’s a bit hard. 
14 
15 335 (Field Notes, October 2017) 
16 
17 336 Being hidebound to funding, the Talent Team experienced that Sport England 
18 
19 337 used their systemic power to prescribe changes. This relationship was explained by a 
20 
21 
22 338 participant from another GSO: ‘They are being pushed. You know governing bodies are 
23 
24 339 being pushed by UK Coaching, by Sport England. To make sure they have these things 
25 
26 340 in place…’ (Lead Officer, GSO). These prescribed changes included changing 
27 
28 341 normative coaching practices and more oversight of how the NGB spent their funding. 
30 
31 342 GSOs shared a consensus that funding and the NGBs relationship with them 
32 
33 343 could provide the Talent Team with a set of armour when negotiating changes within 
34 
35 344 the sport. However, the Talent Team experienced funding as an offer they were 
37 
38 345 compelled to accommodate to receive funding. Instead, the resource rigidity led to the 
39 
40 346 Talent Team experiencing ambiguity between external funding restrictions and internal 
41 
42 347 pressures challenging their social position. 
43 
44 
45 348 The Talent Team limited coaches from carrying out normative practices in their 
46 
47 349 efforts to comply with funding conditions. They asserted their formal authority by 
48 
49 350 terminating coaches who did not readily integrate. However, most subcultures perceived 
50 
51 351 this as a threat to the sport’s essence and as a challenge to subcultural survival. A 
53 
54 352 notable observation was that sudden radical changes worsened the symbiosis. The 
55 
56 353 knock-on effect was that subcultures were destabilised further. The following is a quote 
57 
58 354 from an interview with a coach who openly engaged in antagonist behaviour. Here, he 
60 
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17 361 Subculture) 
18 
19 362 Our analysis of systemic power indicated that it denotes a perception of an 
20 
21 
22 363 organisation, a group or an individual’s right to prescribe adaptive change or create 
23 
24 364 conditions that might warrant adaptive changes. We found that it was an enduring and 
25 
26 365 impersonal system of control. Often enacted in routines, policies, hierarchies (e.g. 
27 
28 366 performance director, talent lead, head coach), or between organisations (e.g. Sport 
30 




35 368 The Emergence of a Destructive Culture 
36 
37 369 The ambiguity between the funding conditions and the internal pressures was the 
38 
39 370 starting point for a process where severe antagonism infected the negotiation of culture. 
41 
42 371 The radical changes imposed by the Talent Team led to a sense of loss of position and 
43 
44 372 resource, and to behaviours to counter their perceived loss. Early signs of a destructive 
45 
46 373 culture were mostly individual behaviours exhibiting open antagonism. Left unchecked 
48 
49 374 these behaviours spread within and across subcultures and magnified in severity and 
50 
51 375 scope: 
52 
53 376 … a lot of feedback from the community, and to start with, quite 
54 
55 
377 aggressive kind of assaults on us. "You just don't know what you're 
57 
58 378 doing. This is rubbish. What's going on?" When we hadn't even started, 
59 
60 379 which made the start quite challenging (TT2) 
do everything to make the programme happen. (Member of Counter 
the one who is responsible for the whole thing like the manager, needs to 
coach, rugby coach, [any] coach. [The coach] sets up the programme and 
the coach setup the programme. Doesn’t matter what coach. Football 
And after I explain to [Talent Manager] how it works in a sports life, that 
Page 17 of 46 Sport in Society 










3 380 Antagonism turned more hostile to counter the Talent Team’s perceived abuse 
4 
5 381 of systemic power. We found that the beneficiaries of antagonism were mainly the 
7 
8 382 transgressors. Moreover, defying the Talent Team increased the transgressors’ 
9 
10 383 informational power as well as weakened the Talent Team’s systemic power. 
11 
12 384 Antagonism increased as adverse behaviours spread to other subcultures and 
14 
15 385 apprehension faded. Achieving more informational power in the culture allowed 
16 
17 386 individuals to draw favourable inferences from their work. Influential transgressors or 
18 
19 387 subcultures engaged in informational power to mobilise and briefly amplify their power 
20 
21 
22 388 through manipulating or coercing individuals or groups into supporting them: 
23 
24 389 I was away on competition last week alone with 12 [athletes]. None of 
25 
26 390 them had ever been to the talent camps. So, the talking went into that. 
27 
28 391 Why they hadn’t been. They just went: “[Community Leader] tells us 
30 
31 392 not to go, so we don’t bother” (Excerpt from Field Notes, December 
32 
33 393 2017). 
34 
35 394 At this stage, the power relations were characterised by how individuals 
37 
38 395 challenged the systemic power of the NGB. Informational power was an interdependent 
39 
40 396 capacity existing between individuals, groups, and organisations. It differentiates from 
41 
42 397 systemic power by being relatively discrete (e.g. rarely formalised by organisational 
43 
44 
45 398 charts or policies). This feature gives it the appearance of being brief and short-term. 
46 
47 399 Informational power existed tacitly between individuals. It was not a possession to be 
48 
49 400 wielded. Instead, informational powers appeared in interactions to produce movement 
50 
51 401 and change. 
53 
54 
55 402 Organisational Outcome – Perpetuation of a Destructive Culture 
56 
57 
58 403 The significant difference between this outcome and the earlier stages was that 
59 
60 404 antagonism and behaviours in violation of societal norms were common in the 
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3 405 organisational culture. Open antagonism, deception, and manipulation were routinised 
4 
5 406 responses to communications from the NGB, as evidenced by this quote from a coach: 
7 
8 407 I can help to attract the better juniors and bring in some of the top- 
9 
10 408 ranked seniors. This will provide these juniors with an excellent 
11 
12 409 experience, which will draw them into the system. I can tell you now 
14 
15 410 that as things stand the best [athletes] won't attend in September. And 
16 
17 411 you'll be left with a choice of omitting them from team selection, 
18 
19 412 damaging the results and alienating the [event] community. Or backing 
20 
21 
22 413 down and picking them anyway. (Excerpt from Field Notes, July 2018) 
23 
24 414 We also found that the loose coupling between this sport and other sports 
25 
26 415 channelled ambiguity to the borders. This loose coupling fed an Impression of a cultural 
27 
28 416 ‘bubble’. Upholding this cultural bubble was critical since idiosyncratic beliefs of what 
30 
31 417 was acceptable (e.g. antagonism and manipulation) buffered outside influences further. 
32 
33 418 Subcultures came to see antagonism as acceptable an as successful responses to their 
34 
35 419 problems. 
37 
38 420 Moreover, most stakeholders within the sport carried out antagonistic behaviours 
39 
40 421 as taken-for-granted. The paradox was that we found that individuals mentioned similar 
41 
42 422 behaviours from other sports as unacceptable in the light of societal norms and general 
43 
44 
45 423 standards of conduct. Yet, they did not perceive themselves as antagonistic nor 
46 
47 424 destructive. The stigma of antagonistic behaviours was shadowed by the subprocesses 
48 




53 426 Rationalising Destructive Behaviours 
54 
55 
427 The subprocess of Rationalising destructive behaviours neutralised the stigma in the 
57 
58 428 cultural bubble. Rationalising allowed individuals to carry out antagonistic behaviours 
59 
60 
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3 429 and distance themselves from a socially undesirable label. This worked through Denial 
4 
5 430 of responsibility, Malleability of euphemistic language, and Social weighting. 
7 
8 
9 431 Denial of responsibility 
10 
11 
12 432 Our analysis showed that denial of responsibility worked as a rationalising strategy. 
13 
14 433 Both on its own and in combination with all other strategies. The hierarchy in the NGB 
15 
16 434 led lower-level employees to rationalise that it was not their responsibility to provide 
18 
19 435 oversight. Furthermore, upper-level employees denied responsibility by appealing to 
20 
21 436 higher loyalties (e.g. if I punish [individual] the event will terminate). Also, the 
22 
23 437 insecurity of external funding led individuals to convince themselves that some 
25 
26 438 behaviours were necessary ‘for the good of the sport’. And punishing powerful 
27 




32 440 Malleability of euphemistic language 
33 
34 441 The malleability of language was a strategy to create perpetual uncertainty. Most 
35 
36 
37 442 individuals in this sport used the malleability of language to neutralise stigma by 
38 
39 443 packaging behaviours as appropriate or less severe. They also used euphemistic 
40 
41 444 language to create uncertainty around professional titles (e.g. psychologist) such as 
42 
43 445 ‘Talent’, ‘Director of Sport’, and ‘Performance Programme’. Doing so allowed 
45 
46 446 individuals to challenge the formal authority of the Talent Team and performance 
47 
48 447 pathway. 
49 
50 448 You know [community leader] calls himself Director of GB [event]? 
52 
53 449 They have basically set up a competing programme under the banner of 
54 
55 450 a GB Senior Programme. And they can promise all these things. But we 
56 
57 451 can’t. Because we have to live up to regulations. And [Sport England] 
58 
59 
60 452 targets (Excerpt from Field Notes, March 2018) 
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3 453 Social weighting 
4 
5 
6 454 Social weighting was the most popular way to neutralise stigma. It occurred daily 
7 
8 455 through otherwise harmless comments, such as ‘He is a bit weird’ and ‘they are not 
9 
10 456 trustworthy’. Most members of the sport aimed to establish doubt or uncertainty around 
12 
13 457 other individuals. Doing so placed doubt at the core of negotiating culture. 
14 
15 458 Intensification occurred when subcultures voiced distrust over the integrity of 
16 
17 459 individuals who raised concern over open antagonism. Individuals reported that 
18 
19 
460 questioning their legitimacy delegitimised their concerns. 
21 
22 461 Moreover, some individuals felt pursued: ‘I feel like [individual] puts things in 
23 
24 462 place to try to catch me out’ (NGB personnel). Individuals also made selective social 
25 
26 463 comparisons (e.g. everybody knows the former performance director was [a tyrant]). 
28 




465 Legitimising destructive behaviours 
34 
35 466 Legitimisation denotes how antagonism (e.g. manipulation, threats, or bullying) was 
36 
37 467 embedded in subcultures by ignoring and denying its occurrence. This subprocess 
39 
40 468 worked in two ways. First, subcultures focused on establishing doubt around the Talent 
41 
42 469 Team. The influence of this was that they experienced being distanced from the rest of 
43 
44 470 the NGB. This distance decreased their systemic power and ability to assert it. This 
45 
46 
47 471 process was an institutional approach to social weighting. 
48 
49 472 [I] attribute most of the [fallout with NGB] to the problems that we’ve 
50 
51 473 had with [conflict]. And that [the NGB] has given me absolutely no 
52 
53 474 support. And saying that [they] would prefer to support the other 
55 
56 475 person. Because they were the person who is in it for the long run. 
57 
58 476 (Excerpt from Field Notes) 
59 
60 
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3 477 Second, some acts lead the NGB to make it critical to update whistleblowing 
4 
5 478 policies and ethical guidelines. They did so to send a signal to external stakeholders. In 
7 
8 479 updating policies, the NGB created an impression of handling the emergence of 
9 
10 480 antagonism. To the outside, individuals were held to the highest standards of integrity. 
11 
12 481 But antagonism was rationalised in the culture. Especially individuals holding high 
14 
15 482 informational power and low substitutability could carry out increasingly antagonistic 
16 
17 483 acts. The quote is evidence of how the NGB led destructive behaviours occur by 
18 

















37 491 Discussion 
38 
39 492 The purpose of this study was to explore the process of how a destructive culture 
41 
42 493 emerges and perpetuates in one sport in the United Kingdom. We found that antagonism 
43 
44 494 and conflict in the power relations shaped the emergence of a destructive culture. Also, 
45 
46 495 stigma was removed via two subprocesses. First, rationalising included using the 
48 
49 496 malleability of euphemistic language to deny any responsibility and foster uncertainty. 
50 
51 497 Second, legitimising denotes how subcultures institutionalised destructive behaviours. 
52 
53 498 They did so by ignoring and denying the occurrence. We also found that changing 
54 
55 
499 structural conditions had a profound influence. Changing funding conditions had a deep 
57 
58 500 influence creating ambiguity and uncertainty within the sport. 
59 
60 
clear that it was not the intention to fire or relieve [transgressor] from 
… [Management] also acknowledged that [transgressor] had done 
[Management] wanted to make clear that it was not [destructive act], and 
 
that the whole matter had been looked over by disciplinary committees 
 
something wrong which could not be condoned. However, it was made it 
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3 501 As suggested by Maitland, Hills, and Rhind (2015), we have identified the 
4 
5 502 organisation as a culture to examine the cultural processes. Our findings further the 
7 
8 503 understanding of culture as a dynamic succession of changing events. Here, culture is 
9 
10 504 temporal and contested through everyday interactions (Maitland, Hills, and Rhind 2015; 
11 
12 505 Alvesson 2017). Our findings show that capturing culture over time as successive 
14 
15 506 events focus ambiguity and change. Doing so also gives us a deeper understanding of 
16 
17 507 the logics behind process-as-it-happens (Helin et al. 2014). 
18 
19 508 Most earlier research viewed organisational cultures through an integration 
20 
21 
22 509 perspective and cross-sectional research (Maitland, Hills, and Rhind 2015). This view 
23 
24 510 assumes an implicit understanding of culture as stasis in a relatively closed system. But 
25 
26 511 it does not account for how culture could move with events. How things are is how they 
27 
28 512 will remain. Many definitions may alert to some kind of ‘dynamic process’. Yet, asking 
30 
31 513 the question: ‘what is culture?’ would most likely result in descriptive accounts. Gergen 
32 
33 514 (2015) explains that describing or mirroring in research is subject to a receding span of 
34 
35 515 application. Providing descriptions of values and beliefs in the search for the proposed 
37 
38 516 ultimate source of culture—basic assumptions (see Schein 2010)—could, therefore, be 
39 
40 517 limited in potential. Instead, the uptake of process in our study contributes to new ways 
41 
42 518 of understanding covert organisational life (Alvesson 2017). Doing so underscores that 
43 
44 
45 519 culture is more than what is shared since it includes ambiguity and diversity (Mcdougall 
46 
47 520 et al. 2017). And capturing findings along the way holds the Grounded Action method 
48 
49 521 as suitable for theorising change processes. 
50 
51 522 Our findings draw attention to the dynamic succession of change. We find it 
53 
54 523 appropriate to discuss our contribution through a lens of organisational change. 
55 
56 524 Cruickshank, Collins, and Minten (2014, 2015), suggests that gaining an understanding 
57 
58 525 of the context underpin driving culture change. Our findings support this idea. Yet, we 
60 
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3 526 also found that the context relates to both preconditions and ongoing structural 
4 
5 527 conditions. Carrying out one analysis of the context before a change process might not 
7 
8 528 be sufficient for organisational practitioners (Helin et al. 2014). 
9 
10 529 In the light of our study, we suggests that we can have stronger confidence in 
11 
12 530 their suggestion that a change process is underpinned by ongoing power relations or 
14 
15 531 ‘power flows’ (Cruickshank, Collins, and Minten 2014, 2015). But, our findings also 
16 
17 532 suggest that the findings of Cruickshank, Collins, and Minten (2014, 2015) and Cole 
18 
19 533 and Martin (2018) are limited since all three studies overemphasise a leader’s ability to 
20 
21 
22 534 manage culture change proactively. Instead, we emphasise that power is relational. 
23 
24 535 Culture change is thus subject to ambiguous and diffuse sources (e.g. funding or 
25 
26 536 antagonism). Not just leader-led. 
27 
28 537 Mannion and Davies (2016) suggest that few large, complex organisations are 
30 
31 538 characterised by a single dominant culture. Likewise, we found that the organisation 
32 
33 539 was a boundary of multiple subcultures. The unique feature of this organisation was 
34 
35 540 how subcultures negotiated culture. We can—based on these findings—have increased 
37 
38 541 confidence in the robustness of Mannion and Davies (2016). The significance of this is 
39 
40 542 that it leaves cultural leaders with fever levers to control culture and produce predicted 
41 
42 543 results (Alvesson 2017). 
43 
44 
45 544 The present study provides first insights into how a culture denies and ignores 
46 
47 545 the emergence of less socially desirable behaviours. Mountjoy (2018) expresses the 
48 
49 546 importance of safeguarding policies and procedures to protect those working and 
50 
51 547 participating in sport. Contrary to her point, we found that updating safeguarding and 
53 
54 548 whistleblowing policies were perceived as a tick-box exercise. Only serving as 
55 
56 549 protecting the reputation of NGBs and sports in general and reassure the public that the 
57 
58 550 sport adhered to societal norms and standards. The implication is that it serves as 
60 
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3 551 outward communication and less as inward oversight. Thus, an ineffective approach to 
4 
5 552 curb antagonism or unacceptable behaviours. Instead, our findings second the voice of 
7 
8 553 six-time Olympic medallist, Aly Raisman: ‘Their [USA Gymnastics] biggest priority 
9 
10 554 from the beginning and still today, is their reputation’ (Mountjoy 2018, 2). 
11 
12 555 Interestingly, the Duty of Care review (2017) recommends a greater emphasis 
14 
15 556 on such policies. The psychological impact of this study, however, is that sports 
16 
17 557 organisations should introduce wider measures to protect athletes and staff. Our 
18 
19 558 findings reinforce that introducing a Sports Ombudsman to provide independent 
20 
21 
22 559 oversight and assurance that welfare is addressed should be an immediate priority 
23 
24 560 (Grey-Thompson 2017). In fact, the Swedish Sports Confederation has already 
25 
26 561 introduced a Sports Ombudsman in November 2018 to reinforce safe sport for children 
27 
28 562 (Riksforbundet 2018). 
30 
31 563 Finally, discrediting and creating uncertainty about individuals was at the core 
32 
33 564 of rationalising and neutralising antagonism. Looking beyond sports, this type of social 
34 
35 565 weighting involves impugning the legitimacy of those who would raise questions about 
37 
38 566 destructive working practices (Campbell and Göritz 2014; Ashforth and Anand 2003). 
39 
40 567 Anand, Ashfort, and Joshi (2005) describe this as a type of rationalisation where the 
41 




46 569 Strengths and limitations 
47 
48 
49 570 A strength of this study is that it unravels how a destructive culture emerges by studying 
50 
51 571 processes along the way rather than in retrospect. Doing so reinforces integrating AR 
52 
53 572 and GT as a suitable method. The limitations of this study might be that sharing control 
54 
55 
573 over the research enterprise might threaten the technical adequacy. Here, the first-author 
57 
58 574 had to honour the inputs of the participants outside just delivering data. However, the 
59 
60 575 epistemology of this study is explicitly participative. In turn, we recognise the possible 
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3 576 bias of being dependent on people (Smith and McGannon 2018). This study employed 
4 
5 577 all the core elements of GT. However, we did so in a new epistemology. Some 
7 
8 578 researchers may interpret this as a limitation. On one side, Weed (2017) asserts that GT 
9 
10 579 should only be used in one of the established epistemological variants (i.e. realist 
11 
12 580 positivist, realist Interpretivist, or constructivist interpretivist). Yet, other studies have 
14 
15 581 used GT in other epistemologies such as critical realism (Redman-Maclaren & Mills, 
16 
17 582 2015) and feminist constructivist (Allen 2011). The critical consideration here is that the 
18 
19 583 method is employed coherently with the epistemological assumptions (Sparkes and 
20 
21 
22 584 Smith 2009). An example of how this is a strength in this study is the process of 
23 
24 585 interrogating for theoretical saturation. We meet with many different stakeholders, both 
25 
26 586 inside and outside the organisation, to discuss the findings as per the ethical approval of 
27 
28 587 this study (Corbin and Strauss 2015). Future research could focus on scrutinising our 
30 
31 588 findings of how destructive cultures emerge by employing different epistemological and 
32 




37 590 Concluding Thoughts 
38 
39 591 The destructive culture in this study developed in a context of a fragile symbiosis. It 
41 
42 592 was characterised by how individuals perpetuated doubt and uncertainty. They did so by 
43 
44 593 packaging antagonistic behaviours in euphemistic language or denying its occurrence. 
45 
46 594 First, ambiguity arose from conflict between systemic and informational power. One 
48 
49 595 example of this was how the NGB felt compelled to follow funding conditions to 
50 
51 596 impose change. However, subcultures combated this through manipulating and coercing 
52 
53 597 others. Second, we suggest that the lack of oversight and supervision made the sport 
54 
55 
598 susceptible to the normalisation of antagonism. And later the normalisation of a 
57 
58 599 destructive culture. 
59 
60 
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3 600 Protecting participants and the sport was a paramount consideration. We 
4 
5 601 emphasise that we conducted the study at a specific period. And findings are not 
7 
8 602 generalisable beyond the context of the study. Yet, the transferability of the findings is 
9 
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5 Overview of participants. 


































  Programme  
42 Theoretical Sampling 3 Group Label N Gender Approach 
43 Individual Interviews 
44 
Members of counter subcultures 1 Male Skype 
45 Theoretical Sampling 4 Group Label N Gender Approach 
46 Focus Groups 47 
48 Talent Team TT2 5 All males Focus Group 
49 Individual Interviews 











Initial Sample Group Label N Gender Approach 
Focus groups     
Talent Team TT1 4 1 female, 3 males  
Athletes A1 7 3 females; 4 males  
 A2 8 4 female, 4 males  
Coaches C1 3 3 males  
 C2 3 1 female; 2 males  
 C3 2 2 males  
 C4 2 2 males  
     
Parents P1 10 6 females; 4 males  
Individual Interviews     
Assistant Talent Manager ATM 1 Male  
Youth GBR Head Talent Coach GBR 1 Male  
Talent Manager TM 1 Male  
Theoretical Sampling 1 Group Label N Gender Approach 
Focus groups     
Parents of athletes in underserved   areas  P2 2 1 female; 1 male 
 
Theoretical Sampling 2 Group Label N Gender Approach 
Individual Interviews     
Talent Leads from other NGBs  3 All males Skype 












UK Sports  1 Male Skype 
Sport England  1 Female Skype 
English Institute of Sport  1 Male Skype 
UK University Sports Scholars  1 Female Skype 
 
Head of Coach Development  1 Male Skype 
Management  1 Female Skype 
 










































32 Figure 1. Grounded Action Cycles 
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23 Figure 2. Empirical model of the process of the emergence and perpetuation of destructive subcultures 
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